This op-ed was originally published in Newsweek.

American democracy is under attack—from cybercriminals and foreign adversaries seeking to undermine trust in our elections. As members and support staff of The National Task Force on Election Crises, we have seen firsthand how the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has helped build a crucial line of defense, protecting our election infrastructure from cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and physical threats. Yet, at a time when these threats are escalating, the federal government is pulling back its support, putting the integrity of our elections at greater risk.

CISA was established to help secure critical infrastructure, including elections, against cyber threats and foreign interference. Its work has been instrumental in ensuring election officials on all levels have the resources, intelligence, and technical support needed to combat an increasingly sophisticated landscape of threats. It is deeply troubling that the current administration appears to be dismantling key efforts to combat election threats that we cannot afford to lose.

It's no secret that running elections in the U.S. has become an increasingly complex and fraught endeavor. In 2024 alone, Russia, China, and Iran all intruded on our elections. Russia was linked to a false video suggesting election fraud in Pennsylvania, while China was linked to the "spamouflauge" operation targeting candidates in Alabama and elsewhere. Iran was reportedly behind efforts to hack the presidential campaigns and to play up political discord over Gaza. These efforts targeted both parties, and in some cases, simply the election process. Sowing discord and undermining faith in U.S. institutions is a "win" for our enemies beyond influencing any particular race.

There is every reason to think these threats will increase. These intrusions are cheaper and easier than conventional warfare or intelligence operations, yet can yield significant impact. We see these tactics in other democracies, and the U.S., with its complex and decentralized election infrastructure, is hardly immune. Attacks can and do target both political parties. Moreover, these efforts may be turbocharged in the future by AI capabilities, which were not fully in place in the 2024 cycle but may be more sophisticated and readily available to bad actors going forward.

State and local election offices do not have the resources or expertise to handle these threats alone. Election officials are already stretched thin and often work with outdated technology and limited cybersecurity training. They need and have welcomed federal support to help ensure that U.S. elections are secure on all levels and have voters' trust—as affirmed in a recent bipartisan letter from the National Association of Secretaries of State.

This is why it's dismaying to learn that newly confirmed Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem is considering significant cuts to the agency's election security efforts. Sources have revealed several key officials within CISA's election security team have been placed on administrative leave, while Secretary Noem reconsiders its work on election threats. The reported move of laying off between 300-400 staffers includes a team of 10 regional election security advisors who played a vital role in the 2024 election cycle, helped officials respond to drop box arson, fentanyl-laced letters, a wave of bomb threats, and coordinated misinformation campaigns. DHS has also suspended support for the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)—a collaborative network of stakeholders supporting the election community—and may have permanently terminated it. The lack of clarity surrounding the extent and nature of the cuts is itself a challenge to election officials in their ongoing work to ensure adequate protections.

The DHS move follows Attorney General Pam Bondi's dismantling of an election threats group within the FBI. The FBI unit was established in the first Trump administration to combat foreign malign influence efforts and worked collaboratively with other government units, including the team at CISA.The 2024 elections unfolded relatively smoothly but largely because of tremendous preparation by election officials, with support from agencies such as CISA. Without the monitoring, deterrence, and education the federal government has helped provide, foreign interference could escalate. This gap will create opportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities, spread chaos, and erode trust in our democratic processes.

Congress and other political leaders must act to ensure our election security focus remains robust. Election officials from both parties have praised CISA's work, and lawmakers should ensure they continue to receive this critical support. Election security is not a partisan issue—it is imperative for our national security. While cyberattacks are part of the modern threat landscape, the hollowing out of our election cybersecurity defenses will inevitably prompt the question, "Was this cyberattack successful because of these cuts?"

We recognize that each administration will seek to recalibrate agency work and adjust strategy. But there should be no retreat from the goal of combatting cybercrime, foreign malign influence, and other threats to our elections. Americans heading into the 2026 and 2028 elections with a less secure system than in 2020 or 2024 is an unacceptable and avoidable step backward.