### EARLY VOTING SECURITY Frequently Asked Questions

#### 1. What steps are taken to ensure early voting is secure?

- Voting equipment used to tabulate ballots is certified by the bipartisan Board of State Canvassers and tested by local election officials before use.
- All voters are checked in at their early voting site to make sure they are registered to vote, and that they have not already voted before they are issued a ballot.
- The early voting electronic pollbook prevents double voting by providing regular updates on voter activity, reflecting when a voter has cast a ballot.
- Bipartisan groups of election inspectors run early voting sites under the supervision of local clerks.
- Voters cast their ballot using paper ballots which are then stored in secure, sealed ballot containers.
- Precinct results from ballots cast at early voting sites are not posted until after polls close at 8 p.m. on election night so that no early election results are known or made public.
- All early voting site results are reviewed by the bipartisan Board of County Canvassers before certification. Early voting ballots are available for recounts and audits like all other ballots.

# 2. What prevents voters from voting more than once at several early voting locations?

- Some municipalities and counties may share early voting sites, meaning that voters within these jurisdictions can choose from several early voting locations to cast a ballot. Other jurisdictions may only have one early voting site.
- The e-pollbook, a list available at each early voting site containing the names of registered voters within the jurisdiction, is updated in real time with voting activity to ensure that people are not voting at more than one early voting site.

## 3. How is the e-pollbook secure?

 Each laptop / e-pollbook device has multiple levels of security required for an election worker to access and operate the device, including a physical, multi factor authentication (MFA) device, and a coded grid card. This is part of a layered approach so that if a single technology is compromised for any reason, it doesn't cause a loss of security in the system.

- Each grid card and multifactor authentication device is securely stored and tracked, and can only be checked out to an authorized, specific person each day.
- The multifactor authentication devices and grid cards are only used during early voting, not on Election Day. Election day e-pollbooks are not connected to the internet.

### 4. How does the physical, multi-factor authentication device (MFA) work?

- A physical, Multi-Factor Authentication key looks similar to a USB drive, and is required to access the e-pollbook laptop. It must be plugged directly into the laptop.
- MFA is an account login process that takes multiple steps and requires users to enter more information than just a password for increased security.
- Clerks manage and securely store these items so that the correct multifactor authentication device connects with the correct laptop only, and that only authorized personnel have access to it.
- If the multifactor authentication device is compromised for any reason, it can be deactivated remotely.

### 5. How does the Grid Card work?

- A grid card works like an analog version of an authentication application.
- The grid card is a piece of paper containing multiple data cells of information, like a bingo card. Grid cards are used in each polling place. The computer will ask for a code from the grid card, and the election inspector has a set time limit to input the correct code.
- The grid card is unique to each polling location and is refreshed to contain new codes every day.

## 6. How are the tabulators programmed during early voting?

- Tabulators must be programmed using one of the following configurations:
  - All tabulators are programmed identically and will accept ballots from any precinct included in the Early Vote site's region/coverage area.
  - Identically programmed tabulators will be treated as a single tabulator when balancing and completing the physical pollbook. OR
  - Tabulators are programmed to accept a subset of ballots from precincts included in the Early Vote site's region/coverage area. This option prohibits programming a precinct on more than one tabulator within the site. Each uniquely programmed tabulator will have a corresponding

physical pollbook.

# 7. How are tabulators secured overnight during early voting to prevent tampering?

• Tabulators are required to be stored overnight in a locked room or building. •

Tabulators are not connected to the internet.

#### 8. What measures are being taken to secure the permanent absent ballot list?

- To ensure the voter's identity, the signature on a returned ballot envelope is matched against the voter's signature on file in QVF by the clerk's office. Each clerk is trained in signature matching by the Michigan Bureau of Elections.
- A voter must be removed from the permanent absentee ballot list if any of the following occur:
  - (a) The permanent mail ballot voter submits a signed request to rescind the voter's application to receive an absent voter ballot by mail for all future elections.
  - (b) The permanent mail ballot voter is no longer qualified to vote in this state.
  - (c) The Secretary of State or the appropriate city or township clerk receives reliable information that the voter has moved to another state, or has moved within this state without updating the voter's registration address.
  - $\circ~$  (d) The permanent mail ballot voter does not vote for 6 consecutive years.

## 9. What should people do if they get a ballot that they didn't request?

- Voters on the permanent absentee ballot list who move addresses within Michigan should update their address on record immediately by visiting Michigan.gov/Vote. If a voter does not update their address, a ballot may be sent to their former address on record.
- If a voter receives an absentee ballot intended for someone else who does not live at their address, they must place it back in the mail receptacle (mail box, postal box, etc.) with a notation that the person is not at that address. This would then be reliable information for the clerk to use to send a cancellation notice to that voter, start the cancellation countdown, and remove that voter from the

permanent ballot list.

• Voters receiving an absentee ballot intended for someone else MUST NOT open, complete, sign, or submit the absentee ballot. Doing so is a serious crime that may be subject to federal prosecution.