"Why did it take so long to get the results from the mail-in ballots?”
“How are ballots received, counted, and secured?”
“How do you know that the people counting your mail-in ballots didn't just throw away all the ones they didn't like?”
You have questions, we have answers!
Read the steps involved in counting your mail-in ballots in Frederick County. If you have any questions, please contact us at lwvoffc [at] gmail.com.
1. Ballot Received
Prior to Election Day there are two ways the Board of Elections can receive mail-in ballots: direct delivery by Post Office employees or from Board of Elections Drop Boxes located throughout the county.
When delivered by Post Office employees, mail-in ballots are handed directly to Board of Elections employees. The unopened ballots are counted and stored in daily batches, locked in secured cages in a secured facility. They remain there until the Board of Elections begins the process of counting paper ballots.
Drop boxes are manufactured by the state to be large and heavy and can be moved only with the assistance of a lift. The drop boxes are placed at locations that are well-lighted and under 24-hour camera surveillance; additionally, random local police/sheriff checks are performed.
There is a single 18” x 2” slot for voters to insert their ballots. The ballot falls 2 feet into a plastic bin that can be accessed only through a door at the front of the box; this door is secured by two locks. Keys to those locks are controlled and in the possession of the Board of Elections. The door is also sealed by numbered tamper tape placed across the opening below the door.
The drop box is emptied once a day (twice after Early Voting starts) by a bipartisan team of two from the Board of Elections. These individuals are sworn election officials. Each time the box is emptied, a chain-of-custody (CoC) document is initiated. The tamper tape seals are removed, the physical seal is placed on the back of the CoC, and the tape serial number is recorded on the front.
The access door is unlocked, the plastic bin is removed, and any ballots are placed in a lockable tote labeled with the name of the drop box location. Before replacing the empty bin back in the drop box, its interior is checked to recover any ballot that may have missed the bin. Once all ballots have been placed in the tote, it is secured by two locks.
The collection bin is placed back in the lock box and the door secured by the two locks. A new tamper tape seal is placed on the door and its number recorded on the CoC document. Tamper tape seals are also placed on both ends of the tote, and their numbers are recorded on the CoC document. Both members of the team sign the CoC document certifying the pick-up and transport of the ballots. The sealed tote is transported to the Board of Elections office where it is received by a Board of Elections employee who checks the numbers on each seal and signs to certify the CoC document. All three individuals then sign and certify the CoC document, again to acknowledge transfer to the Board of Elections control.
2. Ballot Counting Process
A volunteer (1) was paired with another volunteer (2) who was from a different political party and not a family member. The two sat opposite each other (masked and divided by a plexiglass shield).
A numbered stack of ballots was given to the pair, and the ballots in the stack were counted to confirm that the number was correct. Each volunteer signed a sheet signifying that the number was correct.
Volunteer 1 opened the ballots, removed and set aside any extraneous pages (such as the instructions), and checked that all pages of the ballot were enclosed. Volunteer 1 then read the marked ballot to Volunteer 2, who entered the results onto the screen in a ballot marking device. Write-in candidates were spelled out to ensure they were entered exactly as written.
Volunteer 2 then read the ballot back to Volunteer 1 to confirm that Volunteer 2 had entered all the results accurately. If confirmed to be correct, Volunteer 2 printed the ballot; the printed ballot was passed to Volunteer 1 and the original ballot was passed to Volunteer 2. Volunteer 1 then read the results of the printed ballot to Volunteer 2, who checked it against the original ballot to ensure all entries were correct as the voter had marked. If confirmed as being correct, the ballot was stamped as “Verified” and set aside. (Read more about the League's involvement and election security and poll auditing in our December newsletter.)
3. Secured Processed Ballots
The original ballot was placed back in its envelope and placed in a separate container. After all the ballots in the stack were input and verified in this manner, the number of completed ballots was counted to confirm that all ballots had been processed. The processed ballots were handed to a person who fed them into the vote counting machine.
As additional security, the activities of Volunteers 1 and 2 were switched periodically. All activities were recorded via closed-circuit television and live-streamed at the Board of Elections website for anyone to watch.
The counting machines are verified at the end of each day, tallied and the number of entries is verified against the number of paper ballots
4. VERIFICATION and AUDIT Process
- Maryland uses a paper-based voting system. There is a paper record of every vote cast, so these ballots can be re-tabulated if needed.
- The network used to generate the official election results is NEVER connected to the internet.
- Maryland’s voter registration database is secure and encrypted, and the system is continuously monitored and audited.
- Immediately after each election, the Maryland State Board of Elections conducts an automated audit, and each local board conducts a manual audit of the ballots cast.
https://elections.maryland.gov/voting_system/ballot_audit_plan_automated.html
https://elections.maryland.gov/press_room/rumor_control.html
“Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency”. Elections are administered by state and local officials who implement numerous safeguards to protect the security of your vote pursuant to various state and federal laws and processes. This resource is designed to debunk common misinformation and disinformation narratives and themes that relate broadly to the security of election infrastructure and related processes. It is not intended to address jurisdiction-specific claims. Instead, this resource addresses election security rumors by describing common and generally applicable protective processes, security measures, and legal requirements designed to protect against or detect large-scale security issues related to election infrastructure and processes.” Rumor Control | CISA
